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Environmental Law
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which
met in Stockholm in 1972, sought to clarify the obligations of states
to protect the environment of the entire planet and to develop in-
stitutions capable of focusing and pursuing those concerns.' The
Conference was a benchmark in indicating changing perspectives on
international environmental affairs, but its immediate effect on inter-
national law was necessarily marginal. A beginning was made, but
legal analyses of global environmental problems are still characterized
by piecemeal, overlapping, and often contradictory classifications.
This Note will suggest a basic conceptual framework and use it to
assess both the adequacy of the existing legal order and means of
improving the prescription and application of international environ-
mental law. 2 The analysis will be grounded on three basic observations.
First, the traditional international legal order already has available
numerous provisions for achieving some environmental goals, includ-
ing particularly the protection of national resources and freedom of
access for all states to the common resources of the earth. Second, the
threat of a global environmental crisis has outmoded this pattern of
prescription and application in several respects, although governments
have begun to perceive the imperative of a less state-centered perspec-
tive in their prescription of international environmental law. Third,
given the character of the international system today, there is a com-
pelling need for states to undertake increased and strengthened initia-
tives for the application of international environmental law.
1. For details of the Conference, see REPORT OF THE UnITED NAToNs Co.NFEaPFNcE o.x
THE HUMAN ENVIRONM WEr, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Raronr].
One hundred and thirteen nations including the People's Republic of China attended.
but the Soviet bloc countries (with the exception of Romania and Yugoslavia) were not
represented, in protest against use of the "Vienna formula" which enabled West Germany
but not East Germany to attend. See also B. WARnD & R. D'nos, ONLY O.E EArTi 207
(1972).
2. For purposes of this Note, "prescription" is the cr)stllization of general policies-
by agreement, custom, or otherwise-in continuing community expectations. "Applica-
tion" refers to the final characterization of concrete circumstances according to pre-
scriptions, the enforcement of principles in practice. For more details, see McDougal,
Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J.
LEGAL E . 253, 403, 423-26, 429-32 (1964).
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I. The Inherited Legal Order of the Environment
"International environmental law" is a new concept and its scope re-
mains unclear. Environmental issues encompass economic and social as
well as strictly ecological problems. These issues may be international
for one or more of at least five reasons: (I) actions in one country may
have transnational effects;8 (2) certain practices by states or their na-
tionals may have deleterious consequences for the common resources;'
(3) environmental programs may result in distortions of international
trade or development assistance;a (4) specific environmental problems
are common to enough countries to recommend their resolution
through international cooperative efforts;0 and (5) because of their
great genetic, aesthetic, cultural, or historical significance, some endan-
gered species, objects, or monuments within particular sovereign states
warrant international measures for their protection.7
There is thus an international environmental dimension to virtually
every question in the global decision process. If decision-makers are to
arrive at more effective political choices, however, it is necessary to
identify more specifically those international problems with the most
immediate environmental impacts.
The central problems can be framed in terms of three basic sets of
principles dealing with the use and enjoyment of resources: principles
of competence over resources, principles regulating their employment
in use, and principles governing realization of benefit. Use of the con-
cept of resources (including human resources) permits the comprehen-
sive treatment of environmental issues, uniting ecological criteria with
traditional property considerations. This formulation thereby encom-
passes both the legal distinctions between ownership and use and the
underlying economic concepts of allocation and distribution. Within
this theoretical framework, consequently, principles from traditional
fields of international law can be combined into a coherent order of
"international environmental law."
3. See pp. 1665-66 infra for examples of acts having harmful impact across state
lines for which liability has been assigned.
4. For a definition and examples of common resources, referred to In international
legal parlance as inclusive resources, see pp. 1662-63 inIra.
5. See, e.g., p. 1669 infra; REPORT 101-05.
6. See, e.g., p. 1671 infra. Many problems of urban growth and population distribu-
tion are of this type. See REPoRT 89-95.
7. Possible examples include whales and other endangered species, wilderness areas,
the city of Venice, and Greek vases. For recommendations for action on such resources,
see REPORT 22-31.
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A. Principles of Competence Over Resources
"Competence" over resources may be defined as comprehending Eie
right to prescribe and apply law in relation to such resources. The UN
Declaration on the Human Environment summarizes the regime of
competence:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the principles of international law, the sovereign right
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmen-
tal policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.8
There is a fundamental tension in this system: On the one hand
states have a sovereign right to manage, develop, allocate, distribute,
and otlerwise control their own resources; but, somewhat analogous
to the sic utere principle in domestic law,9 they also have the respon-
sibility not to injure interests beyond their borders.
These rights and duties vary depending on whether the resources in
question are exclusive or inclusive-that is, whether they are "owned"
by the state or are instead part of the res communes, to be shared with
all other states. Exclusive resources include the land masses10 and their
closely proximate waters (in particular, internal waters 1 and the terri-
8. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, in
REPORT at 2, Principle 21 [hereinafter cited as Declaration].
9. Sic utere tuo ut aienum non laedas (use your property so as not to injure that
of another) has been described as one of those "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations" which the International Court of Justice is to apply by virtue of
Article 38 of its Statute. See 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 346-47 (Sth ed. Lauter-
pacht, 1955). The extent of the prohibition of the abuse of rights, however, is not at
all certain, and it must be left to international tribunals to apply and develop this
still-controversial doctrine by reference to individual situations. Id. at 347. See, e.g.,
the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1938 (1941), 35 Ams. J. L',r', L. 684 (1941);
p. 1665 infra.
10. International law recognizes five principal modes whereby a state can acquire
title to and exercise exclusive control over territory: discovery and occupation. conquest
or annexation, accretion, prescription, and cession. H. BruGes, THE LAw oF NArsONs 250
(2d ed. 1952). See M. McDOUGAL, H. LA.SSWELL & I. .VLASZC, LAw AND Punuc OnDR I'
SPAcE 828-67 (1963). This principle of exclusive territorial sovereignty is fundamental to
the U.N. Charter. See U.N. CHARTrr art. 2, para. 4.
11. "Internal waters" are defined as "waters on the landward side of the territorial
sea." Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958,
[1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, art. 1. These waters include
"historic bays" and bays with straight base or dosing lines of less than twenty-four
nautical miles, as well as ports and harbors. Id. arts. 7 and 8. Roadsteads also come
within the regimes of either internal waters or on the territorial sea. Id. art. 9. These
internal waters are legally assimilated to their adjacent land masses and are therefore
deemed coastal states' own resources. See M. NMcDOUGAL & IV. BuRKE, TlE Pun3tae OmER
oF a OcEA.s 64 (1962).
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torial sea' 2), their superjacent airspace, 13 the continental shelf,1 4 and
certain genetic, aesthetic, and cultural resources'; within these areas.
Inclusive resources include the oceans, the airspace above the oceans,
and the ocean floor,' 6 the void of space and celestial bodies,'7 inter-
12. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, stpra note 11,
art. 1, recognizes that "the sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and
its internal waters to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea."
There has been much recent dispute over the width of the territorial sea, but no country
disputes the contention that the marginal sea belonging to a coastal state embraces
a belt of at least three maritime miles. The sovereignty that a state may exercise over
this area, however, is subject to certain restrictions-most significantly, the right of
"innocent passage." See id. arts. 14-23. This topic is under extensive current review in
the context of the upcoming U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. See S. LAY, R.
CHURCHILL & M. NORDQUIST, NEw DIRECriONS Ix TIHE LAW OF TIlE SEA: DOCUMENTS 737
(1973).
13. Access to such airspace is entirely dependent upon the subjacent state, which is
free to decide unilaterally whether or not to admit foreign aircraft and under what
conditions. See Convention on International Civil Aviation (the "Chicago Convention")
done December 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180 (1947), [1944] T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295,
art. 1; M. McDOUGAL, H. LAssWELL & 1. VLASIC, supra note 10, at 254-57.
14. The continental shelf is defined as the seabed and subsoil adjacent to the coast
but outside the area of the territorial sea "to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas." Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April
29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.AS. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 1. The Con-
tinental Shelf Convention specifies that rights over the shelf are "exclusive." If a coastal
state does not explore or exploit its resources, no one else may do so "without the ex-
press consent of the coastal State." Id. art. 2. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case.
[1969] I.C.J. 3, the International Court of justice held that the basic provisions of this
convention codified preexisting customary international law. Thus, they reflect norms
binding on all states rather than only the adherents to the treaty.
15. See note 7 supra. The status of genetic, aesthetic, and cultural resources has tra-
ditionally been determined by that of the area or medium within which they are lo-
cated. Since most are situated on the land masses (although, of course, a multitude of
creatures critical to ecological systems live in the sea), they have been treated as subject
to the exclusive competence of the country possessing jurisdiction over that territory.
16. Ships of all states may traverse the high seas almost entirely free of prohibition
by any state or group of states. See M. McDOUGAL & IV. BURKE, supra note 11, at 767.
The conventional regime regarding free use of the airspace above the high seas is very
much the same. See Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, done October
13, 1919, corrected text in U.S. Dep't. of State Pub. No. 2143 (1944), and the 1944
Chicago Civil Aviation Convention, supra note 13. Since the seabeds and the ocean
floor were only recently opened to direct access by man, there are few explicit pre.
scriptions regarding competence over them. Their main use has heretofore been for
laying long distance communications cables and no one has challenged the perntissl-
bility of their use for this purpose. See Mi. McDOUGAL & V. BURKE, supra note 11, at 780.
Explicit recognition of inclusive competence in regard to the three areas is found in
the Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, art. 2, which provides for the exercise by both coastal and
noncoastal states of "(1) Freedom of navigation; (2) Freedom of fishing; (3) Freedom
to lay submarine cables; (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas."
17. The inclusive character of the void of space and celestial bodies has been estab.
lished by the past practice of states and by concomitant expressions of expectations by
different community spokesmen. See i. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & I. VLASIC, Sui rpm
note 10, at 226-27. A UN General Assembly resolution in 1961, for example, provided that
outer space and celestial bodies "are free for exploration and use by all States . . . and
are not subject to national appropriation." International Cooperation in the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 6 (1961). See Dcc.
laration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 15 (1963). See
generally Question of Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 18, at 5 (1958); International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 5 (1959); Question of General and Con1.
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national rivers,' polar areas,19 and some flow20 and stock-' resources.
The patterns of legal order dealing with inclusive and exclusive re-
sources are not symmetrical. The use of exclusive resources is subject
to both prescription and application by a single state. Inclusive re-
sources, which are potentially shareable but not necessarily shared
in fact, are subject to a legal system of principles and practices which
are collectively derived but which may or may not be collectively
applied.
plete Disarmament, GA. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15. at 13 (1963). Equality of
opportunity for all states in the use of and competence oser this resource was in-
corporated into treaty form in 1967. Treaty on Principles Governing tile Actisities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. Including tile Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (the "Outer Space Treaty"), opened for signature January 27. 1967,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, text in 6 I'r'sL LEC.AL MATERIALS 386 (1967).
18. The Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterwa)s of International Concern,
done April 20, 1921, 7 L.N.T.S. 51, provides that each of tile contracting states "'shall
accord free exercise of navigation to the vessels flying the flag of any one of the other
Contracting States" and provides further that "no distinction shall be made between
. . . the different riparian states" or even "between riparian and non-riparian states."
Id. arts. 3, 4. Where the shared use of international rivers conflicts with other actisi-
ties of riparian states (e.g., power, industrial uses, dredging, clearing, and maintenance).
the principle of the "community of interest of riparian States" governs. See Case of tile
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, [1929]
P.C.1.J., ser. A, No. 23, at 27.
19. Due to divergences in historical development, there are differences in the inter-
national legal status of the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The original pattern in rela-
tion to the Antarctic was and has remained inclusive. Antarctic Treaty. done December
1, 1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. The Arctic land
masses, however, have traditionally been regarded as sufficiently comparable to the
other land masses of the earth to be subject to exclusive appropriation. Tile Arctic
basin, nevertheless, and despite certain Soviet claims to the contrary, has been subject
only to inclusive access and competence. See M. McDOtJGAL, H. LASS ELL, & I. VLAstC,
supra note 10, at 792.
20. Professor S. von Ciriacy-Wantrup, in RESOURCE CosEtv.TtoN: EcoNoMICs AND
PoLIcIEs 35 (1952), divides resources into two major groupings: tile renewable or "flow."
and the non-renewable or "stock" resources. Professors McDougal. Lassisell and V'lasic.
supra note 10, at 779, add a third category of "spatial extension" resources for "those re-
sources whose most distinct characteristic is their utility as media of transportation
and communication." They cite as examples land and ocean surfaces, airspace and
outer space. Id.
"Flow" resources are themselves divisible into those which are not significantly af-
fected by human action, e.g., cosmic rays, solar radiations, gases, winds, oceanic cur-
rents and tides, minerals dissolved in the waters, and gravitational and magnetic
forces and those which are. The latter class is further subdivisable into those resources
affected by human action which have a "critical zone" (a range of occurrence and re-
production, which, if reduced below a certain level, will continue to decrease in an
economically irreversible fashion), e.g., pelagic seals, whales, and salmon, and those
which do not, e.g., some ocean fisheries and waters of international rivers. See id. at
777-81; CIRIACY-WANTRUI, supra, at 38-40. All these flow resources hase traditionally
been considered shareable and open to inclusihe use and regulation on the basis of
equality of opportunity. See, e.g., note 18 supra (international rivers) and note 33
infra (whales).
21. Minerals are the most important stock resources and have to date most often
been found within the territory of nation states. The same considerations and deci-
sions which have made the land masses and continental shelf stbject to exclusive ap-
propriation, therefore, also embrace these resources. See Right to Exploit Freely Natural
Wealth and Resources, G.A. Res. 626, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 18 (1952); Per-
manent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17,
at 15 (1962); Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA. Res. 2158, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 29 (1966).
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B. Principles Regulating Employment in Use
Through its present prescriptions, the international legal order has
sought to minimize the loss by states of their own resources and to pre-
vent interference with states' use of the common resources. The exist-
ing principles of this sort can be divided, for purposes of analysis, into
two categories: those restricting injurious and those facilitating pro-
ductive and harmonious employment.
1. Restricting Injurious Employment in Use
Traditional international law contains a number of principles al-
lowing states to protect themselves from environmental damage threat-
ening their own territories or their interest in the common resources
and assigning liability should such damage occur. Until very recently,
however, no similar principles existed for the protection of the com-
mon resources per se.
In order to protect itself from environmental damage, a state may
invoke such traditional international law doctrines as those of "self
defense," "self preservation," and "security," as well as the somewhat
less-defined principle of "good neighborliness." 22 Under the varied
doctrines of "self-help," a state confronted with a major threat to its
exclusive resource interests is permitted to exert the "necessary and
proportional" force to avert the danger or to abate its effects. 2 1 In-
ternational law also recognizes contiguous zones within which states
may exercise limited control over inclusive resources for particular
purposes. 24 In addition, coastal states have certain other rights of
22. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 and the complementary provision prohibiting "tile
threat or use of force" in id. art. 2, para. 4.
These self-help prescriptions are supplemented by the principle of "good neighbor-
liness," which obligates states to try to reconcile their interests with the Interests of
neighboring states. This doctrine is probably most highly developed in the law of
international rivers, where a broad standard of recognition and respect for the multiple
and alternative uses of the waters has evolved. See, e.g., Case of the Territorial Juris.
diction of the International Commission of the River Oder, [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No.
23, discussed note 18 supra.
23. "Necessary and proportional" measures always depend for their justification upon
the urgency of the need for protection. The question of self-help in an ecological con-
text was raised most dramatically in the Torrey Canyon catastrophe. The Royal Air
Force bombed the stranded and damaged tanker in international waters in an attempt
to halt further spills of oil which were damaging the English Coast. See Brown, The
Lessons of the Torrey Canyon, 21 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 113 (1968); Utton, Protective
Measures and the 'Torrey Canyon, 9 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 613 (1968). For a more
expansive view of international law doctrines of protection under similar circumstances,
see Hardy, International Protection against Nuclear Risks, 10 INT'L & CoNe.. L.Q. 613
(1968); McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measure
for Security, in M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATEs, STUDIES IN WORLD l'UBLIC ORDER 273 (1960).
24. Contiguous zones are unlike territorial seas in that they are not subject to
exclusive appropriation by coastal states; rather, they are areas over which a state may
exercise specialized jurisdiction for specific purposes having direct effects on the ter-
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abatement beyond their national jurisdictional limits. These rights
derive from the principle of "impact territoriality," which establishes
the competence of a state with respect to events which occur within
or have impacts upon its territorial base.25 This principle was the
legal basis for the recent Intergovernmental Marine Consultative Or-
ganization "Public Law" Convention, which authorizes states parties
to take corrective measures on the high seas to prevent or abate danger
to their coastlines arising out of oil pollution casualties. 20
On the issue of liability, a continuous flow of international decisions,
conventions, and practices indicates acceptance of a standard of strict
liability among states for damage caused by or deprivations resulting
from manipulation of environmental variables. This standard has
been developed by extension of three well-known cases: The Trail
Smelter arbitration, in which an international tribunal found Canada
liable for fumes emanating from a smelter located in British Columbia
and doing damage in the state of Washington;27 the Corfu Channel
ritorial sea, internal waters, or land mass of the state. The Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note I1. art. 1, allows control over a maximum
of twelve maritime miles for purposes of prevention of infringements of "custom, fi-cal,
immigration or sanitary regulations." In addition to control over specific contiguous
zones, but based on the same underlying principle of impact territoriality, countries
have from time to time claimed and been allowed authority over various supplementary
zones-customs zones, fisheries zones, security zones-of greater than twelve nautical miles.
See Af. McDOUGAL & WV. BURKE, supra note 11, at 584-606.
25. The territoriality principle is thus similar to the nationality principle, which con-
fers competence on a state when its nationals are actors, and to the related "passihe per-
sonality" principle, which does so when its nationals are victims. See p. 1670 infra.
It is somewhat narrower than the "protective principle" underlying the various forms
of self-help, note 22 supra, since the latter extends a broad mantle of competence in
relation to events affecting various vital interests of the state as a whole.
26. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties, done November 29, 1969, text in 9 IN''L LEQAL MATE ALS 2
(1969). The "Public Law" Convention, along with its companion "Prihate Law" Con.
vention (International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done
November 29, 1969, text in id. at 45), was finalized and opened for signature and accession
at the IMCO International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage. The con-
vention has not yet come into force; but even were it to do so, it seems to clarify rather
than to add to traditional rights of abatement. The basic standards of "necessity" ("meas-
ures shall not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the end mentioned,"
Public Law Convention, art. 5, para. 2) and "proportionality" ('measures taken by the
coastal State . .. shall be proportional to the damage actual or threatened." id. art. 5.
para. I) are retained, as is the antecedent condition that the threat to the coastline or
related interests of a coastal state must be "grave and imminent" and "reasonably
expected to result in major or catastrophic consequences." Id. art. 1.
27. 3 U.N.R.LA.A. 1938 (1941), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941). The arbitral tribunal
explained its reasoning in a much-quoted passage:
Under principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United States,
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established
by clear and convincing evidence ....
The tribunal holds that the Dominion of Canada is responsible in international law
for the conduct of the Trail Smelter .... [I]t is the duty of the Government of the
Dominion of Canada to see to it that this conduct should be in conformity with the
obligation of the Dominion under international law as herein determined.
The Trail Smelter shall be required to refrain in the future from causing damage
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case, in which the International Court of Justice held Albania respon-
sible under international law for damage to British ships from mine
explosions in Albanian territorial waters;2 8 and the Lac Lannoux ar-
bitration, where it was said that France would be strictly liable if,
due to its hydroelectric utilization of a French lake, damage resulted
to waters draining into Spain..20 Strict liability among states has simi-
larly found expression in several multilateral conventions. 0 Such li-
ability has usually been enforced in the first instance by and against
states, leaving to national legal systems its assertion directly against
private parties.
2. Facilitating Productive and Harmonious Employment in Use
The prevailing pattern of legal principles concerning productive
and harmonious use of resources is relatively simple. Each state deter-
mines the appropriate means of utilization of its own exclusive re-
sources, although accommodations may be worked out where these
regulations affect the interests of other states or their nationals. With
regard to the inclusive resources, however, cooperative behavior is
more organized: All states are accorded equal opportunity to use
shareable resources, such as the oceans; no state may assert general
competence over the vehicles, enterprises, and nationals of other states
in these areas; and most states have consented to follow or have cus-
tomarily followed uniform regulations concerning certain activities.
through fumes in the State of Washington. To avoid such damage the operations of
the Smelter shall be subject to a regime or measure of control as provided in the
present decision. Should such damage occur, indemnity to the United States shall
be fixed in such manner as the governments acting tinder the Convention may
agree upon.
28. [1949] I.C.J. 4, 22. The court had to decide whether Albania was responsible
under international law for the explosions and resultant damage and whether the United
Kingdom had violated the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania by reason
of certain acts (including subsequent mine sweeping) by the Royal Navy in Albanian
waters. The court rendered judgment in favor of the United Kingdom on both questions.
29. 12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 281 (1957), 53 Amf. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959). The arbitral tribunal
held for France after finding that there would be full restitution of the diverted
waters if the proposed electricity project were carried out. It made it clear, however,
that strict liability would have governed in the event of a finding for Spain:
It would then have been argued that the works would bring about a definitive
pollution of the waters of the Carol or that the returned water would have a chemical
composition or a temperature or some other characteristics which could injure Spanish
interests. Spain could then have claimed that her rights had been impaired.
Id. at 303, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. at 160-61.
30. See, e.g., article 3 of the IMCO "Private Law" Convention, supra note 26, which
provides that shipowners "shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which
has escaped or been discharged from the ship"; article 7 of the Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 17, which provides that a state launching an object Into space "shall be
internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural
or juridical persons by such object"; and the new Convention on International Lia.
bility for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, art. 2, text in 66 At. 1.
INT'L L. 702 (1972), which provides that a launching state "shall be absolutely liable
to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the
earth or to aircraft in flight."
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A variety of diverse principles have combined to produce this order.
Facilitating productive employment has traditionally been thought of
in terms jointly of conservation and apportionment. The various fish-
eries,31 pelagic sealing, 32 and whalin 33 conventions, are examples of
international agreements for this purpose. Providing for the harmoni-
ous employment in use of resources has required clarification of prin-
ciples of jurisdiction and limitations thereon. Principles of jurisdiction
over vessels, 34 spacecraft, 35 and aircraft" traveling beyond national
31. The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 138. T.IA.S. No. 5969. 559 U.N.
285, sets up an order whereby all states are granted the right to fish, subject to certain
limitations. The twQ most basic restrictions are: First, states whose nationals ate et-
gaged in fishing in areas where other nationals are not thus engaged shall adopt neces.
sary measures for conservation purposes and shall appl) these to their nationals (art.
3); and second, when nationals of two or more states are engaged in fishing the sane
stock in any area, they shall, at the request of any one of them, negotiate nscesa r
conservation measures and apply them to their nationals (art. 4).
For examples of international accommodation with regard to specific areas and t)pes
of fisheries, see International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952, [19533 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786. 205 U.N.T.S. 65:
International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, done Febniar% 8. 199,
[1950] 1 U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S. 157. with semeral protocols up to
that of November 29, 1965, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 576, T.I.A.S. No. 6841; North-East Atlantic
Fisheries Convention, January 24, 1959, 486 U.N.T.S. 157. 1963 U.K.T.S. 68. For conven-
tions on particular species, see S. LY, R. CuRCnLL & M. NoRlaQutsr, supra note 12.
at 406 passim.
32. The Convention between the United States, Great Britain. Russia and Japan for
the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, July 7, 1911. 37 Stat. 1.542 (1911-13). T.S.
No. 564, 104 B.F.S.P. 175, with sequels of December 8. 1942, 58 Stat. 1379 (1944). EA.S.
No. 415, 26 U.N.T.S. 364, and of February 9, 1957, [1957] 8 U.S.T. 2283. T.IA\.S. No.
3948, 314 U.N.T.S. 105, prohibits pelagic sealing and sea ottering on the high seas
and restricts such activity to areas within the control of the United States. Japan. and
Russia. Canada and Japan are to receive percentages of the gross catch of the United
States and Russia as well as lump-sum payments from the United States in return for
refraining from sealing, an otherwise lawful activity in the oceans. Similarly. eaci of
the other three countries is to receive percentages of the Japanese catch.
33. The International Convention for the Regulation of 1% haling. December 2. 1946.
62 Stat. 1716 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. art. 3, establishes an International
Whaling Commission which is empowered to set up various regulations, including fixing
the total maximum catch of whales by all parties. It is, however, specifically denied
the authority to apportion this catch among the states.
34. A merchant vessel on the high seas or a ship of war any'where is assimilated to
the territory of the state in which it is registered; that state, therefore, retains juris-
diction over it. See H. BRIGS, supra note 10, at 339. The jurisdiction of a state oer
its vessels in foreign national waters is concurrent with that of the coastal state (with
certain qualifications, such as distinctions between civil and criminal questions and
exceptions for "distress" and "innocent passage"). See id. at 361. Neither in shared nor in
national waters, however, does a state entirely lose control over its vessels. On the high
seas there is universal jurisdiction with regard to crines of piracy. See id. at 389. These
jurisdictional prescriptions are supplemented by a host of ancillary regulatory rules.
such as those dealing with safety and navigation. See, e.g., International Regu.
lations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, approved May 17-June 17. 1960. [1965]
16 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 5813; International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, June 17, 1960, [1965] 16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27; done
April 9, 1965, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 411, T.IA.S. No. 6251.
35. The Outer- Space Treaty provides that a state on whose registry an object
launched into space is carried "shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object.
and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body." Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 17, art. 8.
36. The International Air Services Transit Agreement ("Two Freedoms"), opeened
for signature December 7. 1944, 59 Stat. 1693 (1945), E..S. No. 487, 84 U.N.T.S. 389, art.
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boundaries have been derived both by custom and international agree-
ment. Similarly, prescriptions popularly described as "private interna-
tional law" confer jurisdiction on the courts of a state to protect its
nationals and other interests from injury, including injury consum-
mated beyond its boundaries.37 Finally, those principles traditionally
labelled "responsibility of states" impose certain limitations on the
competence of states over aliens and their property with respect to
events otherwise within their jurisdiction."
Although specific provisions in this area of law have varied some-
what with changes in technology, the underlying principles have long
retained the acceptance of the international community. As a result,
for centuries there has been little attempt to carve up the commons
or to monopolize competence over them. They remain allocated to
inclusive enjoyment, regardless of the actual distribution of the bene-
fits derived from them.
C. Principles Governing Realization of Benefit
Along with questions of who can make and apply law with respect
to resources, there are also problems concerning who shall derive
benefit from such resources and in what capacity these rights shall be
enjoyed. While realization of benefit is largely dictated by techno-
logical capacity, the result is also partially determined by broader
issues of relations among states and of human rights in relation to
resources.
1. Relations Among States
The regime of national control over exclusive resources and of equal-
ity of opportunity with regard to shareable resources must be viewed
in the context of the practical limitations on the power and capabilities
of states. Many countries in the world today are able neither to exploit
1, § 5, expresses the jurisdictional principles governing aircraft in a negative fashion;
it allows any state to revoke a certificate or permit "in any case where it is not satis-
fied that substantial ownership and effective control are vested in the nationals of a
contracting State."
37. This set of prescriptions and practices is often known in the United States as
the "conflict of laws" but in most other countries is referred to as "private interna-
tional law." It traditionally includes three general subjects: the bases on which a court
will assert jurisdiction over the persons and the subject-matter, the effect to be given
to judgments rendered by courts of other states, and the principles governing choice
of law. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 79 (1968).
38. Prescriptions of "responsibility of states," also frequently referred to as those
of an "international minimum standard," have proved difficult to define in a number
of current efforts to "codify" or "restate" them. They constitute a sort of "interna-
tional bill of rights" as to the person and property of aliens. See generally id. at 275-425.
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their own resources nor to enjoy the use of the commons without the
assistance and cooperation of other states.
It is here that the traditional principles of international law, which
focus on rights rather than capabilities, are particularly inadequate.
Solutions to the conflicts between the "have-nots" and the "haves" are
not provided for by the established principles concerning the use and
control of resources.3 9 The developing nations fear that the great com-
mercial powers will use their advanced technology to deplete the re-
sources of the commons upon which they too depend. The frequent
controversies over fishing rights are reflections of this concern. 40
There is also a fear that the growing environmental concerns of the
advanced industrial states will be implemented at the expense of the
continued economic and social development of the poorer countries.
Both the World Bank (IBRD) and the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID), for example, have now formulated en-
vironmental criteria which are to be used in evaluating requests for
development assistance loans. 41 Such actions can lend themselves to
accusations that the poor are being made to pay for the past environ-
mental mistakes of the rich.
2. Human Rights in Relation to Resources
The problems surrounding realization of benefits from the earth's
resources go beyond those of relations among states to ultimate ques-
39. See Report and Working Papers of a Panel of Experts, Development and En-
vironment (the "Founex Report" 1971) and Development and Envirotst-ent, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 48/10 (1972). See also Recommendations for Action, Nos. 102.09, in Ru'oar. supra
note 1, at 54; pp. 1675-76 infra.
40. See pp. 1675-76, 1679 infra. In accordance with the so.called "Santo Domingo
Doctrine," several Caribbean countries have claimed special sovereignty oser ;he reneable
and non-renewable natural resources (but not over the seas per se) in an area ad-
jacent to their territorial seas which they have denominated the "'patrimonial sea."
See Specialized Conference of Caribbean Countries Concerning the Problems of the
Sea: Declaration of Santo Domingo, done June 9, 1972, text in 66 Ast 3. INT'L. L. 918
(1972). Iceland has also claimed a "fisheries zone" of fifty nautical miles off its coasts.
See the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, pp. 1675-76 infra. In addition. Chile. Ecuador.
and Peru have long claimed territorial seas of two hundred nautical miles. See Dec.
laration of Santiago on the Maritime Zone, August 18, 1952, Eng. transl. in 4 M.
VHrrEMNAN, DIGEST OF IN'L L. 1089 (1968). Many other countries have extended their
claims to various widths of territorial seas and fisheries zones. See S. ODA, THE IN Tn-
NATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOI'MEN7T 368 (1972).
41. See AcENcy FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FEASIBLrrY STUDIES, ECONOMIC AND
TECHNICAL SOUNDNESS ANALYSES, CAPITAL PROJECTS (1964, addendum 1972); INTNATIONAL
BANK FOR REcoNsTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMEN-rAL HEALTH AND HUMAN ECO-
LOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN Ecox.Noc DFVELOp.%sFN"r PROJECrs (1972). See also AID Manual
Circulars Nos. 1221.2, Consideration of Environmental Aspects of U.S.-Assisted Capital
Projects, Aug. 18, 1970, and 1214.1, Procedure for Environmental Reiiew of Capital
Projects, Sept. 20, 1971. The World Bank environmental guidelines are still "in.housc"
staff formulations and they have not yet been discussed at an annual meeting. They
are based largely, although not exclusively, on the AID standards.
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tions of human rights and individual well-being. Two additional factors
enter the analysis: the degree to which nationality constitutes the vehi-
cle of access to resources and the degree to which basic human rights
define minimum benefit levels.
The general international law of nationality and jurisdiction over na-
tionals provides little basis for asserting an individual right to specific
resources. Subject to mutually advantageous conditions of reciprocity,
states historically have possessed almost complete discretion in the
determination of who are their nationals.4 2 Once having acquired a
nationality, 43 by virtue of that status and on the terms set by state gov-
ernments nationals derive their claims of access to both exclusive and
shareable resources.
Mitigating this rigid regime whereby the state and not the individual
is the basic legal unit, there is the nascent international law of human
rights. Initially, the right of human beings to some nationality is pro-
tected by customary international law. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights provides that, at a minimum, "everyore has the right
to a nationality" and that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality."'44 It is not
a treaty and therefore technically imposes no legal obligations.4" Fur-
thermore, the individual is not entitled to any particular nationality
or to any freedom to enjoy access to the resources of any particular
nation-state. 4" The right to some nationality, however, is at least theo-
retically established by the international community and from that
follows the right of access of each person through some state to the
shareable resources of the world. Beyond this minimum, the inter-
national community has begun to define other individual and collec-
tive human rights. The International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights47 seek to extend
the right to a nationality to include effective participation in national
42. The Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws,
April 12, 1933, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, arts. 1, 2, for example, provides that "[flt is for each
State to determine tinder its own law who are its nationals." It further specifies that
"[a]ny question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State
shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State."
43. Nationality may be acquired either at birth or subsequent to birth. States
confer nationality at birth upon the basis of jus soli (the birth of such person within
their territory or a place assimilated thereto) or jus sanguinis (the descent of such person
from one of their nationals) or a combination of the two; states confer nationality at
a later stage either by individual or collective nationalization. See HARVARD RESEARCH,
DRAFT ON THE LAW OF NATIONALiTY art. 3 (1929).
44. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/777 at 71, art. 15 (1948).
45. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGnTs, 3 INT'L
ORG. & CONF. SER. 20 (1948).
46. See P. JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 72 (1948).
47. Annex to G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. .16, at 49 (1966). The cov-
enants are reproduced at 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 861, 870 (1967). See also European Conven.
tion on Human Rights, November 4, 1950, Eur. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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decision-making processes and in the sharing of national wealth. This
concept has now been further enlarged in the specific context of the
environment by the Stockholm Declaration, which proclaims as its
primary goal man's "well-being and ...enjoyment of basic human
rights."48
From the perspective of the quality of life and of securing funda-
mental human rights for great masses of people, another matter of
utmost concern is the population problem. This is not only a matter
of human resources, but also of numbers and movement of people in
relation to resources. Although social scientists are far from agreement
upon the specific parameters of the global population problem and the
subject received little direct attention at Stockholm, some work is
underway and a UN conference on population is scheduled for 1974.41
To summarize, the traditional legal order of the environment is
essentially a laissez-faire system oriented toward the unfettered freedom
of states. States are basically unhampered in exercising competence, in
formulating and implementing regulations, and in realizing benefit in
the use and enjoyment of resources. Such limitations on freedom of
action as exist in the traditional legal order have been formulated from
perspectives other than the specifically environmental.
II. Prescription: The Changing Perspective
International law or the lack thereof is not a major causal factor of
environmental problems today. Rather, technological development has
made possible vastly increased rates of resource depletion, energy con-
sumption, and population growth. The perceived imminence of critical
pollution and scarcity thresholds has precipitated a sense of a global en-
vironmental crisis. 50 It consequently is imperative that the legal order
respond to these new conditions.
48. See Declaration, supra note 8, Preambular para. 1, at I. In addition. Preambular
paragraph 5 and Principle 16, both of which deal with population problems, declare
respectively that "[o]f all things in the world, people are the most precious" and
that demographic policies must be "without prejudice to basic human rights." Even
more significantly, Principle 1 declares that man has "the fundamental right to freedom.
equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment that permits a life of
dignity and well-being." Principle 19 explains the ultimate need "to protect and im-
prove the environment in order to enable man to develop in every respect."
49. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 84; note 50 infra.
50. Some observers see increases in population in conjunction with growing per
capita consumption as producing exponential effects on the rate of resource depletion.
Others view the problem as essentially one of transition to new technologies such as
fusion production of energy, mining of the oceans, and a "green revolution" in agri-
culture. See P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION, REsoURCES, E.%vIRoN.%IIa T- ISSuEs I
HUMAN EcOLOGY (1970); J. FoRREsrm, WoR.D DYNAMICS (1971); D. MEADows, D. MlVDows,
J. RANDERS, V. BEHRENS, THE LLmtrrs To GROWTH (1972); E. POUL'AN, l'oi'ut.AnO.: A
CLASH oF PRoPHms (1973); Choucri & North, Dynamics of International Conflict, 24 Womta
PoLmcs 80 (Supp. 1972).
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There are indications that governments are becoming cognizant of
the need for relief and are beginning to adjust the legal order. Change
is necessary particularly with respect to the protection of the common
resources, the ability of developing nations to realize benefit from the
resources to which they have nominal right and access, and the right
of the people themselves to realize such benefit.
A. Competence Over Resources
Given the established principles of "sovereignty" and the "sovereign
equality" of states, it would be utopian to suppose that national gov-
ernments would be willing to surrender any competence to apply law
regarding their own exclusive resources. They have indicated some
willingness, however, to comply with international prescription gov-
erning shared resources and even affecting certain ecological matters
within their own national jurisdictions.
This promising trend was evidenced by the new prescriptions and
recommendations adopted at the Stockholm Conference. The Action
Plan for the Human Environment includes more than 200 proposals,
many of which, if effectuated, will involve self-imposed limitations on
some aspects of national lawmaking competence in the interests of the
broader international community.' Similarly, the Human Environ-
ment Declaration, although not technically a legally binding document
affecting national sovereignty, is significant as a statement of funda-
mental principles and as an expression of the expectations and desires
of 113 governments with regard to international action and regula.
tion.52 Finally, the Stockholm Resolution on Institutional and Finan-
cial Arrangements establishes UN organizational channels for future
cooperation and coordination.5 3 Although modest and underfinanced,
this framework will permit future expansion of activities as national
governments are stimulated by environmental developments and pub-
lic pressures to further concrete international actions.
There are some less encouraging developments, including the non-
participation of several Eastern bloc countries in the Human Environ-
ment Conference and attempts by some countries to expand their terri-
51. REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-60. The "Action Plan," inter alia, provides for the
creation of an international monitoring system ("Earthwatch"), recommends the estab.
lishment of a system for international registry of chemicals, recommends the establish.
mient of a "Human Settlements Development Fund," and condemns nuclear weapons
testing.
52. REPORT 2. In addition to its function as an inspirational and educational device,
the Declaration may provide the foundation for future negotiation of treaties codifying
some of its principles.
53. REPORT 61. The Resolution established a Governing Council for Environmental
Programs, an Environment Secretariat with an Executive Director, an Environment Fund,
and an Environmental Co-ordinating Board.
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torial seas or to extend exclusive competence over additional areas of
the continental shelves.54 On balance, however, there is clearly more
international awareness of the comprehensive character of problems
of the human environment than there was before the Stockholm Con-
ference was proposed.
B. Employment in Use
The extent to which the present legal order is state-centered is quite
apparent in the principles governing the employment in use of re-
sources. The rules restricting injurious use are almost all formulated so
as to allow nation-states to protect themselves from environmental dam-
age or to assign liability should such damage occur. "5 Until recently,
the shared resources per se have been virtually ignored. 0 Self-defense,
self-preservation, security, and good neighborliness are all defined in
terms of a sovereign state "self." Contiguous zones are also designed to
protect against injury to the territorial sea, internal waters, or land
masses of coastal states.57
Moreover, the international case law of absolute liability is insuffi-
cient to protect common interests.58 To date it has been applied nar-
rowly for damage inflicted by one country or by its nationals on the
rights, property, or territory of another country, its nationals, or activi-
ties.59 In addition to these deficiencies in international proceedings,
there have been no significant extensions of the jurisdiction of national
courts to adjudicate questions involving spillover effects detrimental
to the interests of other countries or to the international environment.
And finally, the same limitation of state-centeredness has been incorpo-
rated into various treaties dealing with the use of resources.0 0
54. See notes 1 & 12 supra. There have been other discouraging events. notably the
disputes over fishing rights between Iceland and Great Britain and Germany. See pp.
1675-76 infra.
55. See pp. 1665-66 supra.
56. The situation may be changing somewhat, at least in the context of the law of
the sea. The new Ocean Dumping Convention, see note 63 infra, and several draft pro-
posals presented to preparatory meetings for the UN Conference on the Law of the
Sea demonstrate changing perspectives. See, e.g., the documents collected in 2 S. LU, R.
CHURCHILL & M. NoRDQuIsr, supra note 12, at 737. See also Krueger, Ev'aluation of United
States Ocean Policy, 17 McGILL L.J. 604 (1971); Lanctot, Marine Pollution: A Critique
of Present and Proposed International Agreements and Institutions-A Proposed Global
Oceans' Environmental Regime, 24 H,-NsrGs L. REv. 67 (1973); Note, Exploitation of
Seabed Mineral Resources-Chaos or Legal Order?, 58 CoNE.L. L. REv. 575 (1973).
57. See notes 22-24 supra.
58. This deficiency is recognized in the Human Environment Declaration. See p.
1674 infra.
59. See pp. 1665-66 supra.
60. For example, the Outer Space Treaty, supra note 17. art. 7, provides for lia-
bility of a launching state "to another State ... or to its natural or juridical persons";
and even the IMCO "Private Law" Convention, supra note 26, art. 2. provides for
shipowner liability only for oil pollution damage "caused on the territory including the
territorial sea of a ... State."
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There are definite signs, however, that this legal order is changing.
A broader perspective is evolving which will take account of spillover
effects not previously cognizable under international law. The UN
Declaration contains the principle that states "shall further the inter-
national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of
pollution and other environmental damage" that are "caused by activi-
ties within the jurisdiction or control of . . .States to areas beyond
their jurisdiction."'0 This provision by definition applies to the res
communes as well as the possessions of other states. The protection of
the commons is also the stated objective of the Canadian law establish-
ing a one hundred nautical mile "antipollution zone" in Arctic waters,
a zone over which that country has assumed policing power, -0 2 and it is
the subject of the recent "Ocean Dumping" Convention. 3 These pre-
scriptions reflect analysis of environmental costs and benefits in terms
much broader than the particular interests of sovereign states.
The principles facilitating productive and harmonious employment
also display a fundamental, though not complete, state-centeredness.
The traditional legal order has emphasized the facilitation of the use of
these resources by states (and through states, by their nationals) rather
than the preservation of the resources for the general benefit of present
and future generations. 4 Determination of jurisdiction over vessels,
aircraft, and spacecraft is accomplished by their assimilation to the ter-
ritory in which they are registered.0 5 This provides assurance that inter-
national law can be enforced anywhere in the world by at least one
sovereign authority, but it does not ensure that it will be so imple-
mented. The flying of "flags of convenience" is probably the most
notorious device for avoidance of responsibilities under both national
and international laws. 6 Positive commitments by states o protect
61. REPORT 7, Principle 22.
62. In April 1970 Canada enacted the Bill to Prevent Pollution of Arctic Waters.
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970, CAN. REV. STAT. c.47 (1969-70), text In
9 INT'rL LEGAL MATERIALS 543 (1970). Contemporaneously with the passage of the Arctic
Waters Act, Canada modified its declaration tinder Article 36 of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice to decline compulsory jurisdiction as regards issues arising
out of its antipollution measures. See Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the ICJ, id. at 598. See also pp. 1678-79 inlra.
63. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, done November 13, 1972, text in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1294 (1972).
The convention prohibits the dumping at sea of specified deleterious materials and pro.
vides that the dumping of any other material shall be regulated by a permit system
(with criteria for the permits to be promulgated and regulations to be administered
by national governments). At the time of this writing, states are in the process of ne-
gotiating a supplementary treaty to extend the scope of the Ocean Dumping Convention
to cover additional substances.
64. See notes 31-33 supra.
65. See notes 34-36 supra.
66. See generally B. BoczEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENcE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SIUDY
(1962). Ships are registered in Panama, Liberia, or Honduras (Panlibhon), usually to
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their long-term common interests and holistic human interests are
required.
Some such commitments have already been made. The principles of
"private international law" 7 and "responsibility of states"0' 8 have al-
ready been cited as limitations on the activities of sovereign states with-
in their own national jurisdictions. It should also be noted that there
are multiple sovereignties governing some activities and that this fact
affords opportunities for balancing and counteracting the narrow per-
spectives of perceived short-term national interest. 9
C. Realization of Benefit
On the issue of which states will actually derive benefit from the
earth's resources, the internationalist perspective with its calculation
of costs and benefits on a global scale is least far advanced. There are a
few signs, however, that nations are beginning to face the broader eco-
nomic and social dimensions of their activities.
A symbolic acknowledgment of the equitable claims of the develop-
ing nations to realization of benefits was the decision to locate the new
United Nations environmental unit in Kenya. The General Assembly's
choice of Nairobi over the administratively more reasonable alterna-
tives of New York and Geneva is defensible on broad utilitarian
grounds, chiefly psychological and political. 0
In much more concrete form the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
now faces aspects of the realization problem in the new Fisheries Juris-
diction Case. The United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many have challenged Iceland's claim to extend its exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction to a zone of fifty nautical miles around the island.71 At the
avoid wage or tax legislation in the countries of their owners. Even were such advantages
to disappear, however, the continuance of the practice to avoid antipollution or other
environmental regulations is easily foreseeable.
67. See note 37 supra.
68. See note 38 supra.
69. For example, if Panlibhon or other particular flags are used to a'oid interna-
tional or national environmental regulations, see note 66 supra, the states whose na-
tionals own those ships can still directly regulate many aspects of the behavior of their
nationals. Multiple jurisdictions are not unfamiliar to international law; the traditional
law of the sea, for example, provides for universal jurisdiction with regard to crimes
of piracy and for concurrent jurisdiction of the coastal and flag states under certain
other circumstances. See note 34 supra.
70. This decision was reached by the UN General Assembly, to which the choice of
a location had been referred by the Stockholm Conference. See Nairobi vs. New York,
N.Y. Times (editorial), November 15, 1972, at 46, col. 3.
71. On April 14, 1972, the United Kingdom filed in the Reg itry of the ICJ an
application instituting proceedings against Iceland; on June 5, 1972, the Federal Re-
public of Germany instituted similar proceedings. The underl)ing agreements upon
which these suits are grounded are to be found at 397 U.N.T.S. 275 (1961) and 409
U.N.T.S. 47 (1961). The Icelandic Resolution of the Althing on Fisheries Jurisdiction,
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time of this writing, the ICJ has issued a preliminary injunction against
Iceland7 2 and has decided that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate both
controversies, 73 but it has not yet rendered a judgment on the merits.
It can be argued that the extension of such zones might protect large
areas of the seas from resource depletion, in addition to protecting the
interests of less economically advanced states which cannot yet effec-
tively compete for their "share" of the shareable resources.14 Fisheries
zones clearly would represent an extension of unilateral application of
law, but the situation is ambiguous with respect to prescription. There
are a number of explicitly environmental dimensions to the question:
First, whether countries possessing these zones will be willing to assent
to multilateral prescription of conservation standards; second, whether,
until and unless multilateral agreement is reached, the added control
and economic incentive that may be derived from regulating or licens-
ing will impel these countries to give greater priority to environmental
variables in their unilateral prescriptions. Only if both are true would
these zones be analogous to the Canadian position on Arctic waters.
In view of changing perspectives on international affairs, it may be
expected that the ICJ will at least consider the environmental dimen-
sion as one factor determining its decisions.
Finally, however insecure the position of the developing countries,
even less progress has been made toward ensuring that the people them-
selves reap the benefits of the world's resources. It is at least a hopeful
sign that the first principle of the Stockholm Declaration states:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that
which extended the fisheries limits to 50 miles, appears in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATEMIALS 6413
(1972); and Iceland's Regulations Concerning the Fishery Limits off Iceland appears hI
id. at 1112. See also Belgium-Iceland: Agreement on Fishing within Fifty Mile Limit
off Iceland, id. at 941.
72. Order Concerning the Request for Indication of Interim Measures of Protection,
August 17, 1972, text in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1069 (1972). See also Order Con-
cerning the Question of the Court's Jurisdiction, id. at 1077. The World Court issued
similar orders concerning interim measures and jurisdiction in the Fisheries Jurisdlc.
tion Case of Germany v. Iceland. See id.
73. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland) and Fisheries Juris-
diction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland ICJ, judgnents of February 2,
1973). In each instance the court reached its determination of jurisdiction by a vote
of 14 to 1 (Judge Padilla Nervo dissenting).
74. The Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] IC.J. 116, which arose
out of a dispute over fishing rights of British vessels in Norwegian coastal waters, might
provide a precedent. The central issue in the case was the validity under international
law of a Norwegian Royal Decree of 1935 which delimited Norway's exclusive fishing
zones off its northern coast. In holding for Norway the ICJ attached considerable sig-
nificance to the fact that the Norwegians were poor and needed the fish:
Finally, there is one consideration not to be overlooked, the scope of which ex-
tends beyond purely geographical factors: that of certain economic interests peculiar
to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
[1951] I.C.J. at 133.
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permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present
and future generations.J
While such an optimal future must be seen as a distinct long-range
goal, a far more effective regime of international environmental law
than presently exists can in the meantime be developed by persuading
national governments to measure the damage they do to the environ-
ment and the costs of avoiding such damage in terms of global impact.
The shift to better environmental perspectives, in other words, need
not await either world federalism or the full realization of human
rights and dignity.
III. Application: The Vehicles of Change
This necessary shift in perspective need not await the formation of
broad-based international regulatory bodies. All governments should
collectively apply and enforce the principles and regulations of inter-
national environmental law, and in some narrowly defined areas they
may well do so. Given the difficulty of obtaining such concerted action,
however, even under United Nations auspices, it is necessary to look
elsewhere for the principal effort to apply international environmental
law.
One promising alternative or supplement to full global cooperation
lies in regional organization. A great many ecological problems are pre-
dominantly regional in scale and can most effectively be understood
and dealt with at that level. A variety of regional bodies already possess
delegated authority to formulate principles dealing with various aspects
of resource planning and development."0 These organizations might be
capable of assuming additional responsibilities for the application of
environmental prescriptions within their areas of competence."
75. REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
76. Four main types of regional bodies are relevant in this context: regional bodies
within the UN framework of broad competence (e.g., the Regional Economic Comimis-
sions), United Nations regional bodies with functional specialties (e.g., the Specialized
Agencies each have regional networks), multipurpose regional bodies whose mandate
includes environmental matters (e.g., the OECD, CMEA, NATO. O.S), and single.focus
non-UN bodies (e.g., river commissions such as the International Joint Commission and
fisheries councils such as exist for the Mediterranean and Indo-Pacific Areas). For a
useful catalogue of regional and other environmental organizations, see E., mox,%r-s.,E.
POLICY DivisioN, CONGRESSMAL REsEARCIt SERvicE, LiARY OF CoNGnS, 92d CoNG., 1st
SEss., ENVIRONMENTAL AcTIvITIEs OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Colin. Print 1971).
77. The present and potential vehicles of change are, of course, not limited to re-
gional, intergovernmental organizations. International actors of all tqpes-governmcntal
and nongovernmental, professional and nonprofessional, public, private, and mixed-
could be involved. For examples, see SMITIISONIAN INSTITuTION, DitRaCoRY OF EsIrON-
MENTAL MONrroRING SYSrEmS (1970) and U.N.C.H.E. Bibliography, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
48/13/Rev. (1972).
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In the final analysis, however, the primary responsibility for appli-
cation of international environmental prescriptions must still fall upon
individual state governments. To a large extent, this simply entails
abiding by the prescriptions collectively developed. States, for ex-
ample, have delineated their individual responsibility in the new
Ocean Dumping Convention, which provides for national prohibi-
tion, permit systems, monitoring, and policing of waste disposal at
sea.78 Under a recent UNESCO convention states have also recognized
their duty of "ensuring the identification, protection, conservation,
presentation and transmission to future generations" of the world's
cultural and natural heritage, and they have bound themselves to take
"effective and active measures" toward these ends.70
Full and prompt application of environmental prescriptions may
nevertheless require more radical solutions by concerned states-at least
until adequate international action is taken. The controversial Cana-
dian Arctic "anti-pollution zone" is an example of such unilateral
action. s0 Within that zone, Canada has forbidden the deposit of wastes
and other forms of pollution, imposed absolute civil liability and pen-
alties for violations, and authorized "pollution prevention officers"
to carry out extensive inspections and other regulatory measures. Can-
ada bases its action not on an extension of sovereignty,81 but rather on
general theories of impact territoriality and state security,"2 on an
78. See note 63 supra; AM. Soc. INT'L LAw, THE QUESION OF AN OCEAN DUMPING
CONVENTION (1972).
79. UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, adopted November 16, 1972, arts. 4 & 5, text in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1358 (1972). The same UNESCO General Conference which adopted this convention
also unanimously adopted a companion Recommendation Concerning the Protection,
at a National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage, id. at 1367. See Convention
on Wetlands of International Importance, id. at 963.
80. For a heated exchange of views between the United States and Canada con-
cerning this legislation, see U.S. Statement on Canada's Proposed Legislation, 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 605 (1970) and Canadian Reply to the U.S. Government, id. at 607.
See Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian 'iew,
3 J. MARITIME L. & COmmERCE (1971); Legault, Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Legislation, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE UNITED NATIONS AND OCEAN MIAN-
AGEMENT 294 (Proceedings of the 5th Annual Conf. of the Law of the Sea Institute
1970). Cf. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses
on the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1970); Henkin, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does
Canada Make-or Break-International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1971).
81. See Canadian Prime Minister's Remarks on the Proposed Legislation, 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 601 (1970).
82. The Canadian Reply to the U.S. Government, supra note 80, at 607, for ex-
ample, pointed out, "For many years, large numbers of states have asserted various
forms of limited jurisdiction beyond their territorial sea over marine areas adjacent
to their coasts." It then went on to explicate that "[flit is the further view of the
Canadian Government that a danger to the environment of a state constitutes a threat
to its security." Id. at 608.
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archipelagic principle,83 and on the special characteristics of the situa-
tion.S4
Regulated "fishing zones" and other "resource zones," such as those
currently claimed by Iceland and several Latin American coun-
tries,s5 may be another answer to the global environmental imperative.
Whether they are, on balance, justified is not yet clear. At least they
represent efforts to regulate the use of common resources. If some
such measures are not taken by sovereign states-collectively if possible,
but individually if necessary-even the minimum goals of the Stock-
holm Conference will never be realized.
It would be naive to ignore the grave problems connected with this
approach; unilateral state action and multilateralism or international-
ism are not always readily compatible. National actions for the pro-
tection of the common resources may interfere with other aspects of
international law. The Canadian legislation itself interferes with cer-
tain traditional freedoms of shipping and oil transport on the high
seas.8 6 Even internal environmental measures may conflict with the
interests of other states or private parties. The United States safety
and emission standards for automobiles, for example, have potentially
devastating effects on the exports of foreign manufacturers.8 T National
83. .In introducing the Arctic Waters Act in the Canadian House of Commons, Sec-
retary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp several times referred to the "Arctic
archipelago." While emphasizing that Canada has always regarded these as Canadian
waters, he reaffirmed that the legislation did not represent an assertion of general
sovereignty over the area. See PAR.L. DEB., H.C. 5948 (April 16, 1970 (Can.)). See also id.
at 6015 (April 17, 1970 (Can.)).
84. The argument is not uncontested. During the March 1973 debates in Subcommittee
3 on Marine Pollution of the UN "Seabeds" Committee (Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction).
for example, the Legal Advisor of the Canadian Department of External Affairs pointed
to recent British legislation as supportive of his nation's position. This claim was
strongly contested by the British delegation.
The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1971, c. 21, defines offenses and establishes liability
for oil pollution under various circumstances. The radical nature of the legislation is
the provision that the British Government may by Order in Council, and "in such
cases and circumstances as may be specified in the order," apply the Act to a ship:
(a) which is not a ship registered in the United Kingdom; and
(b) which is for the time being outside the territorial waters of the United Kingdom.
Id. § 16. The legislation is in implementation of the 1969 Brussels Convention. supra
note 26, which has not yet come into force. See also The Prevention of Oil Pollution
Act 1971 c.60; The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971, c.59. For a brief
discussion of the Canadian view of this British legislation, see Johnston, Marine
Pollution Control: Law, Science and Politics, 28 INTL J. 69, 85 (1972).
85. See pp. 1669, 1675-76 supra.
86. See Canadian Prime Minister's Remarlis on the Proposed Legislation, supra
note 81, at 602.
87. The safety and emission standards which have been enacted by the United
States Congress are applicable to automobiles imported into the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857f-2(b) (2) (1970). Foreign manufacturers may not be able to participate in the
shaping of U.S. legislation or share in the development of the necessary technology.
Their export problems are further complicated by the fact that other countries are
developing their own standards for auto safety and pollution and that the laws are not
uniform.
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environmental regulations for the protection of common and internal
resources may also create countervailing duties or give rise to other
problems under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.88 And
finally, all the measures considered above raise procedural questions
of what international and national courts and other tribunals shall or
may assume jurisdiction over environmental disputes that arise.8
Conclusion
Aside from the need for further information and exchange of intelli-
gence, two main sets of conclusions result from the above analysis:
First, in the prescription of international environmental law, multi-
lateral initiatives aimed at reducing the state-centeredness and increas-
ing the environmental responsiveness of the legal order are developing
and deserve every encouragement. They must be supplemented by the
concurrent adoption of sound ecological principles by national politi-
cal processes. Second, in its application, multilateral action at the
global and regional level is to be hoped for as the long-term solution.
Given the character of the existing international system, the most im-
mediately promising course for achieving environmental protection
appears to be increased assumption by individual states of the respon-
sibilities for implementation of collectively derived prescriptions or,
in their absence, of reasonable unilateral standards and criteria.
In particular cases the validity of policies and actions must be judged
not only by their compatibility with established norms and standards,
but also by their desirability in light of environmental conditions de-
veloping in advance of formalized legal processes. In all circumstances
and on the part of all actors, a conscious and systematic attempt must
be made to take account of the environmental dimensions to every on-
going political process.
88. Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) states its
fundamental principle as nondiscrimination in world trade through general and 1n-
conditional "most-favored-nation" treatment. Agreement concluded October 30, 1917,
61 Stat. pts. 5-6 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. (1947); appearing as amended
[1951] 2 U.S.T. 1767, T.I.A.S. No. 3930, 278 U.N.T.S. 168 (1957). Article 20 on "General
Exceptions," however, allows adoption or enforcement of measures 'necessary to pro.
tect human, animal, or plant life or health." If Article 20 is broadly interpreted to
include the diffuse area of "environmental" regulations, the "exception" may very
well swallow the rule.
89. International lawyers increasingly have been turning their attention to the matter
of international and national machinery for the settlement of international environmental
disputes. See, e.g., Jessup, Do New Problems Need New Courts?, 65 PROCrDINcs, AM.
Soc. INT'L LAw 261 (1971). The UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
has recently decided to undertake a study of the matter.
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